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ARTHUR J. DYCK* 
For centuries now, philosophical and religious ethics, particularly 
religious ethics, has reflected on the moral responsibilities of physi­
cians, patients, and of the patients' families. Ethics is the body of sys­
tematic thought which informs the perspective of this essay. 
Among the practitioners who draw upon ethics are the clergy. It 
should come as no surprise, then, that the clergy frequently become 
involved with patients who are confronted by serious health problems. 
When these patients do not know or appreciate the full extent of their 
illnesses, they wonder about the seriousness of their condition and 
whether they will live or die. They speculate, for better or worse, about 
what is in store for them in the future. The clergy is called upon to 
provide comfort and, at times, advice about which particular course of 
action a patient should pursue; patients, however, often bring to these 
dialogues insufficient information about their medical condition and 
possible choices. When the physician has not talked in candor with 
the patient, the result is almost inevitably uncertainty and confusion 
about what lies ahead. 
Now there is some assistance for physicians and patients who 
confront the issues of serious illness and how to work together to re­
solve the many issues that may arise with respect to treatment choices. 
Professor Jay Katz, in his recent book The Silent World ofDoctor and 
Patient, I makes a substantial case for the importance of opening up 
meaningful conversations between physicians and their patients. 
What Katz hopes to accomplish is to educate physicians to recognize 
their own limitations, to improve their ability to increase patient au­
tonomy, to err on the side of accepting patients as self-determining, 
and to honor their choices after thorough conversation. The goal of 
this conversation is to provide an informed basis for decisionmaking, 
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thereby enhancing the freedom of patients to be self-determining. Katz 
cites some very moving examples of the mutual relief and comfort ex­
perienced by physicians and patients when they face together the awe­
some truth, in given instances, that a patient's impending death cannot 
be prevented (pp. 219-24). He argues convincingly that dissipating the 
fog of superficial small talk that may envelop patients who fear the 
worst can alleviate much anxiety and guilt and can facilitate what pos­
sibilites may exist for strengthening the bonds of human fellowship. 
Katz demonstrates that genuine conversations between physi­
cians and patients are necessary to reveal to both parties the limits of 
medical knowledge and of self awareness. Katz argues further that 
professional education should foster greater awareness of these mutual 
vulnerabilities and of physicians' obligations to stimulate inner reflec­
tion in themselves and their patients. Con scire-to know together-is 
the root verb of "conscious" and "conscience," and it is through con­
versation that mutual understanding is achieved. 
Katz carefully distinguishes autonomy from self-determination. 
Autonomy refers to the capacity of individuals to exercise their right 
of self-determination (p. 105). In turn, the right of self-determination 
refers to the right of individuals to make their own decisions without 
interference (p. 105). Self-determination has choice as its external 
component; its internal component is reflection. Conversation in­
creases autonomy by increasing the conscious, rational elements which 
enter into decisionmaking. Physicians are obligated to converse with 
patients in order to stimulate the reflection necessary to meet the pa­
tient's need for more autonomy and to honor the right to self-determi­
nation. Although this is paternalistic in Katz's view (p. 110), it is an 
obligation for both physician and patient, grounded in mutuality. 
Katz is well aware that patients may sometimes be reticent or 
even resistant to converse. Some patients see the physician's insistence 
on conversation under these circumstances as an invasion of their 
right to privacy. In a conflict between the values of autonomy and 
privacy, Katz maintains that privacy should be invaded when to do so 
enhances the patient's psychological autonomy: "Insisting on conver­
sation and reflection expresses a concern for patients' needs. The ulti­
mate acceptance of their choices expresses a respect for their rights" 
(p. 141). Katz criticizes current judicial decisions regarding informed 
consent because they do not recognize sufficiently that the failure of 
physicians to converse in ways that strengthen patients' autonomy 
constitutes harm to that patient (pp. 80-82). 
As Katz describes instances of beneficial conversations between 
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physicians and patients, and tragic failures to converse, I find that I 
certainly want to be in the care of the kind of physician Katz is asking 
physicians to be. I wish to have a solid basis on which to make medi­
cal decisions and I value the respect for my capacities by those who 
can help provide that basis. However, were I to be ill, a physician 
would not be the only one with whom I would cherish conversation 
and by whom I would expect to be valued. I have a wife and children. 
I have a brother and sister. I have a minister. I can rely on their love 
and concern, and were I to be confined to a hospital bed, I would have 
the care and assistance of nurses. What does Katz expect of my physi­
cian and of me in the way of conversations with others who care about 
my well-being? Are there obligations to converse with some or all of 
these people? 
Katz might consider these questions somewhat unfair, or at least 
not questions to ask of his book. After all, every work has a limited 
scope, and the focus in his book is on the obligations of physicians to 
cultivate relationships with their patients which foster their autonomy 
and which respect their right to self-determination. Whatever else 
physicians are obligated to do, they should not neglect the conversa­
tions with patients which provide the best basis attainable for decision­
making. Katz could contend that just such a focus has the salutary 
effect of holding physicians strictly responsible for meeting the needs 
of patients for autonomy, as well as helping to actualize their patients' 
right to make choices of great import for their physical well-being and 
self-respect. These are surely points well taken. I will not quarrel with 
them, but neither will I accept them as adequate replies to the ques­
tions I have raised and will raise below. Why is that? 
To begin with, physicians do converse with families. Indeed, in 
the history of medicine, there has been a fairly continuous tradition of 
giving family members a true picture of the patient's condition while 
continuing to hold out hope for recovery in conversing with the pa­
tient, even when recovery is not expected. At times, physicians have 
even withheld the truth from patients at the request of family mem­
bers. These practices really require some discussion, but are absent 
from Katz's book. Even so, we can reasonably infer from what Katz 
says about conversations with patients that he is not likely to favor any 
agreements with family members that would diminish the autonomy 
and self-determination of patients. The family, which can often exert 
a powerful influence upon the degree of autonomy and self-determina­
tion of its members, can facilitate or hinder the attainment of goals 
Katz seeks for physicians and their patients. Families, then, will be 
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part of of the conversations between physicians and patients; if not 
explicitly, then in hidden and unpredictable ways. 
But families are to be reckoned with for still other reasons. Katz 
acknowledges that the policy of accepting the decisions patients make 
has to be limited in at least two instances: first, when patients may be 
incompetent; and second, when patients may be making the wrong 
choices (pp. 157-63). 
With regard to incompetent patients, Katz never takes up directly 
the paradigm instance in which families, particularly parents, are the 
usual conversation partners of physicians: when the patients are chil­
dren. Katz does discuss one case of a fifteen year old patient but does 
not mention the family at all (pp. 161-62). As to whether fifteen year 
olds are to be regarded as competent, Katz is also not explicit. From 
what he does say, one can only assume that Katz is not questioning 
this fifteen year old's competence, but only her refusal of a life saving 
operation. Katz's counsel, which was accepted and which ended with 
the patient's consent and a successful operation, never goes beyond 
persuading the patient's pediatrician to continue the conversation with 
her with the help of a psychiatric social worker (p. 162). Katz's ex­
plicit word on incompetence is found in this brief sentence: "Short of 
substantial evidence of incompetence, choices deserve to be honored" 
(p. 113). 
Katz thus tells us nothing about the difficulties of jUdging incom­
petence in a whole range of cases, notably children, the mentally im­
paired, and patients in a seriously weakened or disabled state. Since 
the focus of Katz's work is on conversation, it is surely necessary to 
determine with whom conversation will take place, not only to make 
treatment decisions per se, but also to assess the competence of the 
patient. If physicians do turn to family members, do their decisions 
deserve the same respect and weight that Katz reserves for competent 
patients? 
But patients who are considered competent may choose wrongly. 
Katz says that he 
would consider disobeying a patient's choice when two conditions 
have been met: one, the consequences of non-intervention pose 
grave risks to a patient's immediate physical condition and, two, the 
process of thinking about choices is so seriously impaired that 
neither physician nor patient seem to know what one or both wish 
to convey to the other (pp. 157-58). 
With regard to the first condition, Katz makes it clear that he com­
templates interference only when illnesses may be treated in ways that 
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prevent death or predictable serious, irreversible physical injuries, and 
only when death or injury would be expected to occur within a rela­
tively short time. But he views this condition as necessary for inter­
vention, not decisive. This interference in patients' choices must also 
meet the test of an impaired process of thinking about choices (p. 158). 
This impaired process is not incompetence, and Katz believes that its 
occurence should be rare whenever conversations have conscientiously 
and sufficiently preceded decisionmaking. 
Even if interference in competent patients' choices is, or could be, 
a rare event, the judgment as to when that is to happen is one that 
Katz apparently is willing to lodge in the physician. What about the 
judgments of husbands and wives regarding the choices of their 
spouses, and the processes of thinking about these choices? What if a 
husband or wife conscientiously believes that life saving treatment 
should be undertaken when their spouse thinks otherwise, and the 
physician judges that the criteria for interference have not been met? 
Indeed, Katz does not tell us how well informed families are supposed 
to be and what weight is to be given to their concern and choices with 
respect to the care of another family member? What about nurses? 
Should physicians consult them in jUdging when interference in pa­
tients' choices is or is not the appropriate action to take? 
For Katz to reply that he is concentrating on the physician-pa­
tient relationship and the nature of their conversations is not enough. 
After all, it is precisely the traditional belief of physicians-that people 
who are not medically trained and who are ill are not competent to 
make choices-which occasions Katz's book. Katz has documented 
the tendency of physicians to assume that a patient's process of think­
ing about choices while ill is impaired in many important respects. 
One could well argue that such instances are not as rare as Katz sug­
gests. Distinguishing incompetence from an impaired deliberating 
process is not always easy, and what I have in mind here may be a part 
of what Professor Katz regards as outright incompetence. A patient 
who is very weak may still be sending out signals of acceptance or 
refusal, which some may regard as "conversation" and others may 
not. 
The argument for conversation with patients, however, is also an 
argument for conversation with others. These might include, for ex­
ample, other physicians, nurses, family members, and other profes­
sionals such as ministers. Because there are judgments to make about 
the limits of self-determination, Katz's ideal physicians, more aware of 
their own vulnerablities and limited knowledge, should perhaps be ob­
ligated to converse with others besides their patients. But is it enough, 
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from a moral and legal perspective, that a choice be self-determining, 
that it occur in a process of thinking which is properly regarded as 
unimpaired, and that life be sustained only long enough to assure that 
process? 
The series of questions I have been raising point to certain inade­
quacies in Katz's portrayal of self-determination. Its boundaries are 
left ambiguous with respect to the relationship between self-determina­
tion and moral responsibility, and between self-determination and 
moral deliberation. I can most quickly illustrate my contention by 
referring to a recent case with which I am familar. 
A young woman, no longer living with her parents, was in a hos­
pital for a relatively routine operation. She showed every sign of an 
uneventful recovery, but then refused to eat adequately. Given her 
history of being a sparse eater, she soon showed symptoms of 
malnourishment which alarmed her professional caregivers. No one 
on the hospital staff was successful in getting her to eat properly. Her 
father, however, who had been through previous similar episodes, was 
able to persuade her to eat sufficiently. The young woman's health 
returned. 
Assume that the attending physician in this case had made every 
effort to converse with this young woman. Assume further that the 
physician had enlisted other professional help. Katz is not clear 
whether he would force this woman to be fed, or whether or when he 
would accept her refusal to eat as her personal right and a choice to be 
honored. In short, do physicians have a strict moral obligation to 
work to save a life that can be saved even when the patient opposes the 
intervention necessary for that purpose? Katz does not explicitly en­
dorse such an obligation, nor does he explicitly obligate patients to 
seek to have life sustained in instances of this kind, where what is re­
quired to sustain life is not an extremely painful, burdensome, or life 
threatening intervention. 
What is the role of the father who thinks his daughter is unable to 
make this decision on her own? He believes his input is needed. 
While it is not clear that Katz views parents as essential partners in 
the necessary conversations between this patient and her physician, 
there is much to suggest that Professor Katz would welcome any aid 
in restoring this patient to health. Nothing in his decisionmaking 
model, however, depicts a network of relations which is required to 
achieve an unimpaired process of thinking about choices. The success 
or failure of parental attempts at assistance is not really the issue here: 
the issue is rather whether any physician should neglect to honor the 
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moral responsibilities family members have for one another. Such ne­
glect may be interpreted as a violation of their rights to self-determina­
tion as it bears on the fate of their family members and on the process 
of making choices. Suppose this young woman to be the fifteen year 
old Katz discussed. Would the wish on the part of either or both par­
ents that she be fed be decisive for Katz? What about a wish by either 
or both that she not be fed? 
As the reader surely is aware, my concern with what Katz leaves 
ambiguous includes, but goes beyond, a desire for intellectual clarity. 
There are moral responsibilities and deliberative processes with re­
spect to them which Katz has not made a predictable, self-conscious 
part of his decisionmaking model. First, all human beings who are 
sufficiently "autonomous" to be "self-determining," in Katz's sense of 
these terms, share a moral responsibility to make reasonable efforts to 
sustain their own life and that of others: Second, there is a moral 
responsibility shared by all human beings, but tied to familial and 
friendship relations in a special way-a responsibility to enhance au­
tonomy and self-determination and to encourage morally responsible 
expressions of that autonomy. 
While parents generally are perceived as moral educators of their 
children, Aristotle contemplated moral improvement as an aspect of 
friendship. Physicians, then, are not alone in being morally responsi­
ble for strengthening the autonomy patients need to be morally re­
sponsible, nor in seeking to be certain that patients' rights to make 
well informed choices are honored. Moral responsibility may some­
times, however, demand that physicians and family members oppose a 
choice even though the process of making the choice does not seem 
impaired. I offered as an example of this a case in which a young pa­
tient chose starvation while feeding that patient was essentially all that 
was needed to restore and maintain her health. 
I have had both kinds of experiences as a family member. I felt 
morally constrained to fight my father's apparent choice to be allowed 
to die; thirty years later I felt morally constrained to respect my fa­
ther's autonomy and allow him to die. In the first instance, my father 
had a massive and painful infection following a gall bladder operation. 
The physician, with undoubtedly compassionate motives, asked the 
family whether treatment with antibiotics should cease. We all op­
posed the cessation of treatment. My father was a strong man in 
otherwise good health. So I pleaded and argued with him as he, in 
. great pain, expressed a desire to die. This was not easy for me to do, 
but fortunately his pain soon passed and his good health returned 
quickly. Loved ones wish one another to exist; that is a very impor­
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tant part of what love means. If mistakes must be made, those who 
wish the life of another will err on the side of life sustenance. 
But we cannot indefinitely love one another into existence and 
sustain that existence. After another thirty years of good health at the 
age of eighty-four, my father was stricken by cancer and spent the last 
month of his life in a hospital. He underwent diagnostic testing upon 
admission but refused further medical tests despite the doctor's order 
for them. Because the attending physician would not disclose his diag­
nosis to my father or our family, we did not have a knowledgeable 
basis on which to oppose these tests. Only when I found a physician in 
which we could all trust did we learn of the diagnosis already on my 
father's hospital chart. Once informed of the diagnosis of terminal 
cancer, we viewed as futile the surgery and further tests recommended 
by the physician first in charge. It required a concerted stand by our 
newly retained physician and our whole family-my brother, sister 
and I-to have the tests halted and the surgery cancelled. 
During this interval, the first physician was seeking consent to the 
medical procedures not from my father, but from the family. As far as 
we were concerned, our father was the appropriate one to decide these 
matters and, despite his growing weakness, he was making it clear to 
us that he wanted no more intervention. He gradually declined over 
the next two weeks. He took food by mouth until three days before he 
died, but then refused. Agreeing that death was imminent, our new 
physician and the family declined to forcefully administer nourish­
ment in those last three days. Our father died peacefully and, as far as 
we could tell, not painfully. 
I wish to emphasize that I do not regard failing to provide nour­
ishment as morally responsible if it will be the proximate cause of 
death or a source of discomfort. In my view, withholding or with­
drawing nourishment can be justified only when death is imminent 
and no discomfort to the patient will result. To justify painful inter­
ventions requires reasonable certainty of a compensating benefit, as in 
the case of life saving surgery that is not in itself unduly risky, or ad­
ministering antibiotics to someone in pain in the reasonable hope that 
thereby health will be restored and the cause of pain eradicated. 
Being morally responsible, then, is not necessarily achieved by be­
ing self-determining. Some expressions of self-determination are im­
moral. Thus, Katz expects self-determining physicians and patients to 
engage in honest communication, striving conscientiously to deceive 
neither themselves nor one another. Deception robs the person being 
deceived of some degree of autonomy and hence of the very capacity 
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to be self-determining. For example, patients who are successfully 
convinced that their illness is not fatal, when in fact it is, do not have 
the necessary basis for making the most reasonable choices with re­
spect to their treatment and how they will spend their remaining time. 
Truth-telling and sustaining life are indeed basic moral values. 
They are requisite for all of the cooperative activities that characterize 
human communities and make them possible, and for self-determina­
tion as well. That communities and individuals need truth-telling and 
protection of life is recognized and evidenced by laws against certain 
breaches in faithful communication2 as well as life threatening and 
homicidal acts. 3 At the same time, legislatures and courts protect a 
wide range of freedoms and increasingly, in medical decisions, what 
has come to be identified as a right of privacy.4 It is precisely at this 
point that serious conflicts arise between satisfying the community's 
obligation to life on the one hand, and to self-determination on the 
other. Three differing views of this conflict are presented in the deci­
sion of the New Jersey Supreme Court in In re Conroy,5 decided Janu­
ary 17, 1985. 
The Conroy case concerns an incompetent, bedridden, eighty­
four year old nursing home patient with irreversible physical and 
mental impairments and a limited li(e expectancy.6 The issue for deci­
sion was a request by her guardian nephew to remove from this patient 
the nasogastric feeding tube which served as her primary conduit for 
nutrients and was necessary to prevent her death from malnutrition. 7 
The trial court which first heard the case decided that the re­
moval of the feeding tube should be permitted. 8 Finding that Ms. 
2. See. e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (excluding privileged information from the dis­
covery process); FED. R. EVID. 501 (shielding statements made within protected relation­
ships against compulsory disclosure on witness stand); READINGS IN LAW AND 
PSYCHIATRY 161-65 (R. Allen, E. Ferster & J. Rubin eds. 1968) (listing of various state 
statutes protecting confidential communications made within the doctor-patient relation­
ship); AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 9 (1957) 
(articulating physician's duty to maintain confidentiality unless disclosure becomes "neces­
sary in order to protect the welfare of the individual or of the community"). 
3. See. e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.1, 210.5, 211.1, 211.2 (Official Draft 1962) 
(Criminal Homicide, Causing or Aiding Suicide, Assault and Recklessly Endangering An­
other Person, respectively). 
4. See. e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2501 (1984); FLA. STAT. § 4 (1984); NEV. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 449 (Michie 1977) (natural death acts); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113 (1973); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321,486 A.2d 1209 (1985); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 
A.2d 647 (1976). 
5. 98 N.J. 321,486 A.2d 1209. 
6. Id. at 335, 340,486 A.2d at 1216, 1219-20. 
7. Id. at 355, 486 A.2d at 1216. 
8. In re Conroy, 188 N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 523, 457 A.2d 1232 (1983). 
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Conroy's life had become impossibly and permanently burdensome, 
the court reasoned that prolonging her life would be pointless and per­
haps cruel.9 At the same time, the court determined that removing the 
tube would lead to death by starvation and dehydration within a few 
days and this death could be a painful one. \0 
In my view, this court did not show sufficient regard for either the 
value of self-determination or of life. Whether a person's life is to be 
regarded as "burdensome" relative to an illness, impairment, or medi­
cal treatment is precisely a judgment that depends on that person's 
own perception. People have different reactions to pain, for example, 
and something one person finds very painful may not be reported to be 
so by someone else. Indeed, we remain uncertain whether one person 
may actually be experiencing a lesser degree of pain or assessing that 
pain based on a higher degree of tolerance for painful stimuli. Neither 
courts nor physicians nor even family members are in a position to 
decide when someone else's life has become too much to bear. 
The trial court in Conroy did something even more astounding, 
however, when it chose to permit an act which it had determined 
would result in death for the patient. What has happened to the pro­
tection of the patient's right to life? I am inclined to think that, if a 
court can sanction an act that is the proximate cause of the death of a 
person innocent of any crime and posing no threat to anyone's life, 
those on the court responsible for that decision should be liable to a 
charge of unlawful homicide or subject to a suit for damages brought 
by the patient's loved ones. 
The New Jersey Appellate Court argued, as I have, that with­
drawing Ms. Conroy's nasogastric tube would be tantamount to killing 
her. I I It would not be a case of letting her die, but would instead be 
active euthanasia. The appellate court regarded such a course as 
"ethically impermissible."12 Since Ms. Conroy was not facing immi­
nent death, depriving her of food would, under these circumstances, 
constitute hastening death rather than simply allowing her illness to 
take its natural course. 
When the New Jersey Supreme Court took up the case, it relaxed 
the strict protection of life announced by the appellate court. I J The 
supreme court asserted a right of privacy that included the right to 
9. Id. at 528, 457 A.2d at 1235. 
10. Id. at 530, 457 A.2d at 1236. 
11. In re Conroy, 190 N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 453, 472-73, 464 A.2d 303, 313-14 
(1983). 
12. Id. at 473-74, 464 A.2d at 314. 
13. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321,486 A.2d 1209 (1985). 
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refuse nourishment, even if death was not imminent. 14 The supreme 
court did expressly limit such a right of refusal to those who were 
deemed to be terminally ill and expected to die within a year or less. IS 
The supreme court did not, like the appellate court, regard this as 
killing such patients, despite the fact that death without proper nour­
ishment would, for many, occur before they died of their illness. 16 
Furthermore, the supreme court did not limit the withholding or with­
drawing of nourishment to instances where patients requested it, but 
extended such permission to instances in which patients were in un­
avoidably severe pain, in circumstances otherwise comparable to those 
of Ms. Conroy.17 The court thereby made a judgment for someone 
else regarding what kind of life is too burdensome. What constitutes a 
burdensome life, however, is emphatically a matter best left to self­
determination. 
Justice Handler of the New Jersey Supreme Court dissented in 
part. 18 Pain, he argued, can usually be controlled. 19 There is often 
disagreement among health care providers about the severity of a pa­
tient's pain, as there was in Ms. Conroy's case.20 Justice Handler took 
the position that judicial permission to withhold a life sustaining treat­
ment from someone incompetent to make such a choice should be lim­
ited to persons terminally ill and imminently dying. 21 Justice Handler, 
then, appropriately in my view, did not wish to involve a court of law 
in permitting an action or inaction which could be the proximate cause 
of an innocent person's death. 
In re Conroy provides an example of how the same case may elicit 
significantly different responses from the three courts just examined. 
The appellate court was the only one of the three to insist that the 
court not permit an act that it perceived as one that would lead to the 
death of the patient.22 The courts, then, do not always err on the side 
of life, as I would urge them to. Although the New Jersey Supreme 
Court claimed that it was protecting life by limiting the withdrawal or 
withholding of nourishment only to terminally ill patients, this claim 
is undercut by their allowance of the withdrawal as much as a year 
14. 	 Id. at 348, 486 A.2d at 1222-23 (citing In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 70, 355 A.2d 
647, 	663 (1970». 
IS. Id. at 363-64, 486 A.2d at 1230-31. 
16. 	 Id. at 350-57,486 A.2d at 1224. 
17. 	 Id. at 364-66, 486 A.2d at 1231-32. 
18. 	 Id. at 388, 486 A.2d 1244. 
19. 	 Id. at 394, 486 A.2d at 1247. 
20. 	 Id. at 394-95, 486 A.2d at 1247. 
21. 	 Id. at 397-98, 486 A.2d at 1249. 
22. 	 In re Conroy, 190 N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 453, 469, 464 A.2d 303, 312 (1983). 
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before the patient's death is expected. This position thus involves the 
court in an act that would be the proximate cause of the patient's 
death. I do not see how such a decision can be left to the courts. To 
counter this improper judicial interference it appears that legislation is 
needed to specify that prior to a patient's imminent death, food and 
water are to be treated like the air we breathe and not only as medical 
treatments. After all, subsequent to removing someone from a respira­
tor, we do not also remove all air from their room to make sure the 
patient will not breathe again. Removing a feeding tube when it is 
needed to sustain life and when death is not imminent is the moral 
equivalent of taking someone off a respirator and then also removing 
any air supply from him or her. The needed legislation, applied to the 
concept of a living will, would limit the content of such a will with 
respect to these decisions about food and water. 
The roles I am suggesting for courts and legislatures with regard 
to medical decisions are minimal, though important. One role is to try 
to assure that life is adequately protected; the other is to try to assure 
that persons who, for whatever reason, are regarded as incompetent 
enjoy the same protection as competent persons. 
Who, then, is generally responsible for medical decisionmaking? 
Katz is right to emphasize the obligation to do what can be done to 
bolster the autonomy of patients and to respect their right to make 
choices. But as I have contended, physicians are not the only ones 
with the responsibility and desire to do this. Friends, family members, 
the clergy, and nurses also can contribute mightily to the freedom of 
patients and can point that freedom in the direction of what is best in 
the moral sense. 
Ethicists have identified certain parameters of decision making 
which tend to function implicitly as criteria of decisionmaking and 
which may be helpfully rendered explicit. These are first, factual 
knowledge; second, vividly imagining how everyone is affected by an 
action or policy; and third, impartiality.23 
The special education and experience of physicians and other 
health professionals impose special responsibilities on them. This in­
cludes the duty of faithful communication and conscientious efforts to 
avoid self-deception. But friends and family members often know a 
great deal about a patient and this knowledge deserves attention and 
evaluation by both health professionals and their patients. 
When physicians or patients or both imagine the effect of a medi­
23. See. e.g., A. DYCK, ON HUMAN CARE ch. VII (1977); W. FRANKENA, ETHICS, 
ch. VI (1973). 
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cal choice, it is vital for them to be in touch with the patient's loved 
ones. While health professionals may sometimes find families or 
friends of patients too zealously opposing or urging treatment, it is 
important that they deal with these positions because patients may 
otherwise adopt extremes of action or inaction. And while health pro­
fessionals need to be advocates of sustaining life and ameliorating ill­
nesses when they can, under some circumstances, especially in the last 
days of a patient's life, comfort may become their central concern and 
may be the most responsible use of their talents. 
Impartiality, in the context of medical care, means at the very 
least equal consideration of the rights to life and self-determination of 
all human beings. It also means that quality of care is maintained and 
applied equally to everyone as is medically indicated and responsibly 
chosen. No one, patient or health professional, is immune from being 
influenced by their likes and dislikes and their own preferences for 
particular modes of care. For these reasons, physicians should wel­
come the opportunity to explore how patients perceive their conditions 
and the care being recommended; they should likewise welcome the 
possible correction of perspective that nurses, the clergy, or next of kin 
may contribute. In this essay I have discussed some examples of a 
parent in one case,24 a whole family in another,25 whose determined 
efforts to keep awake their loved ones' will to live was necessary to 
obtain a recovery from illness. Indeed, I suggest that in those difficult 
decisions which, if followed, could mean death for the patient, a single 
voice insisting on the course of action most likely to sustain life should 
prevail. That voice may be that of physician, nurse, patient, or loved 
one. At the same time, to refuse life sustaining treatment should re­
quire a consensus of these same moral agents. I take for granted that 
someone who feels deeply that the decision being made is morally 
wrong and a violation of the patient's rights has recourse to the courts. 
Jay Katz has done us all a favor by making a case for strengthen­
ing patient autonomy and respect for the freedom to be self-determin­
ing. I have built on these important concepts, but I have tried to 
indicate that achieving this is the responsibility of all health profes­
sionals and loved ones involved with a given patient. In the end, the 
right to self-determination is a right to be morally responsible as well 
as a right to be treated in a morally responsible way. 
24. See supra p. 58. 
25. See supra pp. 59-60. 
